How did the American Republic turn into the American Empire? How did the land that famously declared that its only business was business1 turn into a world-bestriding behemoth that enforced egalitarianism at bayonet-point everywhere from the Congo to Little Rock, Harry Byrd’s Virginia to Ian Smith’s Rhodesia?
The Cold War, of course.
But that’s not really the full answer. After all, following World War II, most Americans thought that America should remain the Old Republic it long had been, focusing on building domestic prosperity and dominating its hemisphere while leaving the rest of the world alone. The Europeans could have their empires, if they could keep them. The Soviets were evil, but also entrenched, and the war it would take to throw them out of the territory FDR sundered to them at Yalta wouldn’t be worth it. Such a view required a strong bomber fleet equipped with a large reserve of atomic weaponry, a strong navy, and little else. Certainly not a peacetime surveillance establishment, massive army bolstered by peacetime conscription, or world-spanning empire.
That is not the view that won out. Though fought for by Republicans like Sen. Taft and old-school Democrats like Sen. Harry Byrd, it lost out to a bipartisan consensus pushed through by President Harry Truman and his advisors and supported by such missives as George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram”: America would dedicate itself to containing the Soviet Union. Not rolling it back. Not trusting the Europeans to defend themselves. Being the containment bulwark that would stop the cancerous rot of communism from spreading, while also failing to eradicate it with atomic chemotherapy. In other words, we would become a nation dedicated to fighting a forever conflict until our resources or theirs gave out.
This required a new way of organizing America. Particularly, it required a new way of supporting an onerously expensive peacetime military establishment that could both stockpile weapons likely to be useful in a Ragnarok-like conflict with the Soviets over the plains of Central Europe and could adapt to rapid technological advances, all while keeping a steady eye both on Soviet advances in nuclear and conventional weaponry and on Soviet subversion at home. Doing so would require compromise and coordination across the political-military-scientific-business spheres, and buy-in from the civilian population, which was heavily burdened by taxes despite the end of the Second World War.
The compromise meant to achieve this was the National Security Act of 1947, which became the “Magna Carta” of the American security state and turned us into something other than the republic we had once been.2 This was not an effortless transition3 out of what had been presumed at the end of the Second World War—that America would return to being America—but a long and hard-fought fight over the soul of the nation that ended in the demise of what had been a recognizable America, and without any real desire to actually defeat the communists.
Instead, those who argued against the ideology of “national security”4—which involved the creation of a massive peacetime military establishment buttressed by a central surveillance apparatus unthinkable in the pre-war years and a bevy of entangling alliances—were defeated by those who argued for the pushing of “democracy” abroad in the name of opposing, though not defeating, the Soviet menace.5
The National Security Act was the means used to achieve this. Its passage was the end of the first round of the Cold War, America’s first real move on the chessboard: it determined the structure of American society in the decades that followed, ensuring demobilization never occurred so that America could always lurch into total war at the drop of a hat (or bomb) if the Establishment decided that doing so was necessary.6 In this article, I will discuss the history of the act and how it transformed America.
A note on sources: The main works I relied on for this article were A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954 by Michael Hogan and A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War by Melvin Leffler. Both are very in-depth, detailed reads, so they are good if you are doing research or very interested in the subject. The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War by Norman Friedman was a very useful introductory work, and was a delightful read—I highly recommend it if you are interested in the Cold War. I also read The Cold War: A New History by John Lewis Gaddis; it was terrible.
Additionally, this is an article that a paid subscriber asked me to write. If you have a topic that interests you, please reach out. It might take me a while to get to it, but if you are a paid subscriber, I will eventually do so! As a paid subscriber, you can also listen to audio versions of every article, such as this one:
The Act that Transformed America
The Preparedness Catalyst
Neither the National Security Act nor the security state created by it emerged out of a vacuum. Rather, both were outgrowths of a horrifying realization for those who believed the absurd WWII propaganda about “Uncle Joe” Stalin: the Soviets were not our friends, remained implacably hostile to non-communist societies, and were only temporarily awed by the power of the A-bomb and their horrific Great Patriotic War losses.
Indeed, they were a particularly dangerous power in that they were not only motivated to hold onto Central Europe to provide the long-desired “buffer” for Russia, but also believers in the doctrine that communism should remain on the march around the world. That realization is why even those more friendly to the isolationist position—led by Sens. Taft and Byrd— were willing to countenance a much larger military establishment than what existed before the war.
What remained undecided is how the threats presented by the Soviets could be best mitigated without unduly disrupting the American way of life. Few would admit they wanted a “garrison state”,7 though what they meant by that phrase remained unclear, as was whether they managed to stave it off. It was out of their wrangling regarding what America should do—both domestically and abroad—that the national security state developed.
The World War II Impetus
Generally, both sides agreed that World War II had been an ad hoc disaster.
For one, anything like the Pearl Harbor disaster (ignoring whether FDR allowed it to happen so he could get America involved in the war) could not be allowed to occur again: the destructive power of modern arsenals made risking such a surprise attack unthinkable.8
Additionally, the services would have to be rationalized. Both the prelude to and fighting of World War II had featured bitter inter-service fighting between the Army and Navy. Intelligence failures created by inter-service bickering of the sort that helped lead to Pearl Harbor were unacceptable, both sides agreed.9 Similarly, each service could not receive infinite procurement money forever, so weapons development and procurement would have to be rationalized in the name of efficiency, as would be the missions of the various services; coordination was a necessity.10
The biggest hurdle was the mindset shift engendered by the general understanding that any future war would be total, and could come at any moment. As Hogan writes, the demands this placed on American society meant that “national security needs had started to dissolve the usual distinction between war and peace in the minds of American policy makers.”
In the minds of those who adopted the then-forming “national security” ideology, “total war necessarily engaged the whole of the nation’s resources, civil and military alike, just as modern weapons brought the battle home to citizen soldiers behind the lines,” and so men like James Forrestal called for a “‘comprehensive and dynamic program’ to which all citizens would contribute, whatever the sacrifices involved.” This program would, in the end, “involve every agency of government and reach out from the state to the great army of industrial workers and to the nation’s farms and factories, its scientific and technological resources, its industrial and university laboratories.”11
The memory of Pearl Harbor and fear of how destructive an atomic conflict could be was thus used to sow the mental seeds for the security state that those behind the ideology of “national security” wanted to develop.12
The Truman Doctrine
Had the situation in Europe remained quiet, it is unlikely that much of this would have mattered. The American people were tired of war, tired of the taxation regime imposed to fund it, and ready for prosperity rather than austerity to follow victory.
Unfortunately, that’s not what happened. Though the Soviets were exhausted by their wartime losses and far from ready for a new armored campaign across Germany or bitter fight over the Caucasus, they had unconventional resources to call upon. After all, they had spent the entirety of the pre-war years seeding agents across Europe and North America, from France and Italy to Greece and D.C. As the war wound down, these agents began to act.
Namely, the Soviets demanded joint control over the Black Sea Straits as their guerrillas waged war in Greece and started to cause trouble in Italy. Britain, overstretched and out of money, couldn’t manage the Mediterranean situation as it once had. America would have to step up and bolster the faltering non-communist regimes, or the whole Mediterranean could fall to the Soviets and their allies. Or so Truman argued when announcing the “Truman Doctrine”: America would replace Britain in being an ally and financial backstop to the Greeks while also pouring money into unsteady non-communist regimes like those in Turkey so as to contain Soviet influence.13
As he called upon Congress to fund those initiatives, he took the opportunity to explain and defend the national security ideology. In the view of the president and his generals, all those earlier issues—the need for an intelligence organization, the need to rationalize the services, the importance of expanding them dramatically in peacetime—had to be immediately addressed so that the Soviet threat could be countered,14 all while America also poured resources into potential allies who would stand against the Soviets.
Naturally, opponents of this transformation of America warned that the “perceived national security needs were turning the country into a garrison state dominated by the Pentagon and by New Deal social programs that cost more than the country could afford.”15 Sen. Taft and others raged against this state of “semiwar” and twilight struggle, but failed to stop the national security ideology from enveloping the country.16
Their failure to stop the rise of the security state came in large part because the widely accepted understanding of what total war required—as large a share of the resources of the world as possible to support as large a defense-industrial base as possible—meant that American politicians, generals, and planners feared that Soviet domination over any larger portion of Eurasia would doom America to be gradually overwhelmed by the forces of world communism and the resources at their disposal.17
President Truman was particularly attached to this understanding,18 and used it to defend not just a large military establishment, but the deep involvement in foreign affairs through espionage, subversion, financial pressure, and the like that was to define much of American Cold War diplomacy. This was first tested with the Truman Doctrine. He thus couched his attempt to transform America in the argument that if such were not done, then America would have to be even more transformed for the worse at some later point.19 Additionally, Truman used this general line of reasoning to push the transformation of the military establishment in the name of rationalization,20 which is what precipitated the National Security Act itself.
The National Security Act: Its Purpose and Provisions
When eventually passed in 1947, the National Security Act dramatically transformed both America and the budding military-industrial-intelligence apparatus that was theoretically meant to defend America.21 The act created a slew of agencies, including the National Security Council, the CIA, and the Department of Defense. It restructured the military. It embraced the new understanding of civil-military-political relationships that stemmed out of early Cold War fears.
That transformation did not come easily, instead forming out of the tedious infighting and wrangling between admirals and generals and the demands for more resources and power pushed by them and civilian defense personnel.
The Feuding
The primary feuding was between the Army and Navy,22 though the nature of their feud tended to draw in the pushers of the new national security ideology and defenders of the old American view of things.
The “Army Plan”, strenuously pushed by such men as Gen. Marshall, was for a unification of the services into a single department of defense. The unified services would be led by a central authority—a cabinet-rank secretary with direct administrative control of the military services, advised by military chiefs of staff representing each constituent service—and the various undersecretaries and like parties whose existence distributed power and decision-making somewhat would be wiped away.23 Champions of this plan argued that it maintained civilian leadership over the armed services while also ensuring efficiency through consolidation.24
The Navy feared consolidation. For one, it suspected that all the rhetoric about efficiency was a ruse to destroy the Marine Corps and the Navy’s air arm,25 as the Army had long been jealous of both. The counter to the Army plan presented by the Navy involved a focus on coordination across the entire total war apparatus—from intelligence and industry to procurement and missions—that also kept the services distinct.26 The Navy plan aimed to learn from the Second World War without changing anything dramatically, and ensure power was distributed enough that civilian leadership over the military remained unchallenged.27 What it lost in potential efficiencies, proponents argued, it gained in being proven to work and more in line with the already battered American tradition.
Though this plan still transformed America significantly, it was far more amenable to those who, like Sen. Taft, feared a centralized military command would create an “American Prussian General Staff” or “Gestapo,” crushing domestic liberties and civilian supremacy in the name of efficiency and quick decision-making.28
This disagreement led to a bitter inter-services feud between the Army and Navy, with both sides refusing to find a compromise solution and even taking the battle into the public sphere with propaganda efforts. Eventually, however, they settled on a compromise bill that became the basis of the National Security Act.
The Navy Plan mostly won out, at least at first. Under the provisions of the bill that Truman submitted to Congress, the Secretary of Defense was kept in a coordinating role rather than made a dictator of sorts, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force were made three separate services.29 Further, the bill included many of the separate, coordinating agencies the Navy plan favored, including munitions and resources boards, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, and other features of the modern security state.30 Addressing the integration of efforts concern that stemmed from the Truman Doctrine announcement and world situation that led to it, and had thus sparked the reorganization of the military and passage of the act, was the National Security Council (NSC), which would advise the President on how to integrate domestic, foreign, and military policies.
While the 1947 bill included some provisions meant to mollify those who feared the powers and tyrannies of a national security state, those with such fears lost on many issues as well.31 Namely, the CIA’s broad access to FBI and Atomic Energy Commission records, and the lack of any requirement that its Director come from civilian life, were worrisome to those like Taft who feared the creation of an American Gestapo. Surprisingly, however, the CIA aspect of the bill received very little consideration and was the subject of surprisingly few concerns at the time the bill was passed.32
Modifying the Bill
Problems were soon to result. Indeed, things were already a mess by 1948 and grew into a potential cataclysm by 1949.
For one, the specific roles of each service were left undefined, as were the processes by which wrangling over who was to do what (and thus get funding for what) remained unresolved. This required the admirals and generals from the three services to sit down and hash it out, and in 1948 their attempts to do so first looked successful,33 but then turned into a mess when the Air Force got cold feet about what it had agreed, and the Navy hit back.34
That turned into the infamous “Revolt of the Admirals”, an episode of interservice rivalry provoked by the limited defense budget President Truman attempted in 1949 as a way of achieving governmental economy. Infuriated by carrier funding getting cut in favor of the B-36 bomber,35 the Navy launched an all-out assault on the DoD’s civilian leadership. For one, Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan resigned in protest. Simultaneously, a slew of high-ranking naval officers, led by figures such as Vice Admiral Arthur Radford and Chief of Naval Operations Louis Denfeld, mounted a coordinated campaign in Congress and the press to smear the B-36 as a vulnerable, “billion-dollar blunder” while also condemning the Air Force’s doctrine of saturation “atomic blitz” bombing as militarily ineffective and morally bankrupt. Then they took things a step further by circulating rumors alleging corrupt political favoritism in the awarding of Air Force contracts, namely the B-36 contract, forcing hearings on the matter.
The poor behavior of the admirals, when paired with such problems as the B-36 bomber corruption controversy, gave ammunition to those who argued that what was going on with the National Security State was un-American. To them, and to much of the country, it seemed America was being dominated by men who didn’t have her best interests, unique culture, or traditions at heart. Instead, it looked like she was being ruled and pushed to forever war by a cabal of generals and technocrats. They weren’t necessarily wrong, as events confirmed.36
This led to something of a change.



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